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Huber: Revolution in Private Law?

REVOLUTION IN PRIVATE LAW?
RIAC AR

G. HuBmR*

More than five years ago the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Shelley v. Kraemer,1 holding that a state court
could not enforce the terms of a racial restrictive covenant. The
opinion in this case suggested, if it did not foretell, a possible revolution in the field of private law. During the last term the Court
decided Barrows v. Jackson,2 which indicates more clearly that such
a revolution may be in process. An analysis of these two cases
and a forecast of their future effect on private law would therefore
seem to be profitable.
I.
BACKGROUND

One manner of stating the basis of democratic government is to
define it as a government where the opposing principles of liberty
and equality are in equilibrium. 3 Both "liberty" and "equality" are
incapable of precise definition, but for our illustrative purposes we
can define them simply in terms of the idea of restraint. "Liberty"
is freedom of the individual from restraint,4 whereas "equality"
is the subjection of a group of individuals to the same restraint,
[Editor's Note: This article will be concluded in a subsequent issue of the
South Carolina Law Quarterly.]
*Assoclate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina, School of Law. This article
was n part written in a seminar under Professor Paul A. Freund, Harvard Law School,
as part of work toward a master's degree. The article has been expanded and updated,
and several new points discussed.

1. 334 U. S. 1 (1948).

2. 73 Sup. CT. 1031 (1953).
3. HADLY, THE CoNFLict BETWEEN LmER AND EQUALITY (1925); Silvbig, The Conflict of Liberty and Equality, 35 IOWA L. R1v. 360 et seq. (1950).
"Freedom for everybody to do what he wants is not necessarily the sole purpose of organized society. There may be other admirable social ends which
conflict with, or demand limitations upon, freedom." WOOTTON, FREEDoM UNDER PLANNING 5 (1945). And see Mr. Justice Jackson's separate opinion in
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 422 at 445 (1950),
where he states: "The task of this Court to maintain a balance between liberty
and authority is never done, because new conditions today upset the equilibriums
of yesterday .... The Court's day-to-day task is to reject as false, claims in
the name of civil liberty which, if granted, would paralyze or impair authority
to defend existence of our society, and to reject as false claims in the name of
security which would undermine our freedoms and open the way to oppression."
4. ". .. freedom may be simply defined as ability to do what you want."
t O UNDER PLANNING 4 (1945). This quotation may better
WooTroN, Fm
suggest that freedom is not entirely negative. Freedom is actually more the
opportunity to do something than an opportunity to avoid doing something.

8
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now most often government imposed.5 These terms certainly need
some sort of definition. 6 The Communistic governments speak continually about the freedom their citizens enjoy, and point to the
American negro as one not free. But Communism is, if we use
the definitions of "liberty" and "equality" given above, essentially
egalitarian, and the American negro enjoys much more freedom
than he does equality. Similarly, when we speak in this country
of every child born here having an equal opportunity of becoming president, we are really referring more to the child's use of
his freedom to obtain that position than to his equal opportunity
to obtain it. Certainly members of unpopular religious and racial
groups do not, in any true sense, have, or at least have not bad,
an equal opportunity with the white male Protestant of becoming
president. And we have seen recently that even geographic considerations can prevent some persons from being considered for that
position. Any member of one of these groups who desires the
position, however, has the freedom to try to gain it through any
means not unlawful.
If we properly understand the principles of "liberty" and "equality," we can see that they are in conflict in a democratic government.
Of course, certain fields of human activity in a democracy are so
restrained that "equality" is completely dominant, as the imposition of such taxes as sales taxes to which all are equally subject.
In turn, certain other areas are unrestricted and free, as is, traditionally, the right to think as one pleases. 7 But in most areas of human activity in a democracy there is this conflict and revolution eventually
become necessary. The success of any democracy depends on
whether there is equilibrium between these forces in those fields
where they conflict.
In the United States, because of our historical development, the
5. This restraint, of course, need not be government imposed. In the Middle

Ages, feudalism imposed on each class an equality obtained by private means
through the ownership of real property. Even the power of the king depended less on any political concept than through his overlordship of all the
land in the nation. And see note 12 infra.
6. See WocrrjoN, Fazzom UNDER PLANNING 5-6 (1945), where, in discus-

sing the great use of such phrases as "freedom from want" and "freedom from
ignorance," Miss Wootton states:

". .

. and the very possibility of conflict,

real enough in experience, between freedom and other praiseworthy social ends
is disposed of by a verbal trick."
7. But see the separate opinions of Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Black
in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 415, 422, 445
(1950) and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Adler v. Board of
Education, 342 U. S. 485, 496 (1952), where the opinions suggest that the majority opinions are permitting the regulation of thought.
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stress has always been on the "liberty" rather than the "equality"
side of our democracy. An excellent case can and has been made,
certainly, that the Constitution was written by a group of men
much more interested in freedom of the individual than in any
equality among individuals. The average American of today does
not think in terms of his being equally restrained with everyone
else. He will not, of course, deny that in many ways he is restrained. Anyone who has listened to a group of farmers discussing the Federal farm program well knows that, vocally at least,
many resent the restrictions more than they appreciate the government checks. A great number of the restrictions now imposed in
this country are a product of the past twenty-five or thirty years.
Because this quite heavy incidence of restrictions is relatively recent, the average citizen still thinks of himself as primarily free,
not primarily equal with others, and probably not as any combination of free and equal together.
It seems incontestable,, also, that the average American citizen
thinks of liberty and freedom in a different manner than the
courts do. This is not, of course, to say that the courts are wrong.
The courts, in discussing the problem of liberty, generally are
working with the Federal and state constitutions. Those instruments theoretically and to a large extent practically establish certain principles as immutable and unaffected by the will of the majority of the people. But when the average person speaks of his
freedom, he is not concerned with his freedom of religion or his
freedom of speech. The reason, of course, is obvious. It is a
typical American whose religion and expressed ideas are not acceptable to the majority of the persons with whom he associates.
Thus, when a typical American is speaking of his freedom, he is
generally discussing, more or less rationally, what is pinching him,
and that is generally some restriction on what we consider his
property interests. Everyone, no matter how acceptable his religion and his views, can be restricted by zoning, price control, or
income tax laws. This is not to say that the average American
does not favor any restrictions, since he realizes that his rights, and
here again usually property rights, can be interfered with by others.
But when the government takes something of value from the average American, he will certainly talk of his rights, his freedom to
use what he owns as he pleases, being violated, even though, as an
abstract proposition, he may favor the projects for which his property is being taken.
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Unquestionably we are a nation composed largely of those whom

the Communist calls the bourgeoisie. Our people are propertyminded, probably because security is a strongly-felt need, and security and property are to the average American much the same
thing. It is certainly not accidental that laissez faire was such a
successful economic doctrine in this country, and the tendency to
speak of the pre-Roosevelt Court as a big business Court is to misunderstand the prevalence among a great percentage of our people
of the idea that, somehow or other, property is a sacred institution. Whether this attitude is a good one is not our problem here
but we must recognize its existence. We can overemphasize this
tendency, since our citizens are not anarchists certainly, but of all
governments existing at present in the world, ours most of all

stresses freedom, and particularly the liberty to use our property
as we see fit.
Another reason why the principle of "liberty" is much more
stressed in this country than is "equality" lies in the history of our
foreign relations since this country became a world power. Those
countries with whom we have found ourselves in serious opposition have not been democracies and, since World War I, have been
totalitarian states. Totalitarianism, especially Communism, is essentially egalitarian as previously pointed out.8 Everyone, except
the ruling classes and the unreconstructed or unreconstructable, is
theoretically equal to everyone else. Thus, in the propaganda fight
presently existing between this country and the Soviet Union, we
stress our freedoms - our liberty from restraint.9 Anyone who
8. See text supported by note 6 supra and following. Even in the European
democracies, there is a greater tendency toward equality than toward liberty
in their governments. This has a historical basis, for the ancient Greek republics did not recognize civil liberties. And, the French Revolution, the very
fountainhead of European revolutionary movements, produced no modern democracy as we know it, but an egalitarian centralized state. Silving, op cit.
supra note 3, at 358-64. And it is also true that economic pressures in these
European democracies seemed to require at all times greater government restriction and planning than was necessary in the United States.
9. The very fact that we stress that side of democratic government which is
less stressed in the countries in which our propaganda is being used helps account for the only partial success our propaganda has had. European democracy is much closer to the egalitarianism of Communism or other totalitarian government forms than this country is, but, in turn, we are closer to
an anarchical form of government than they are. And they fear anarchy as
much as we, and they, fear dictatorship. For a recent example of typical
European attitude toward our government we have only to observe the comments of former Prime Minister Attlee of Great Britain, when he observed that
our Constitution made it difficult and nearly impossible to conduct foreign
relations with this country. While his statements undoubtedly had political
overtones, still the tenor of them indicates a not untypical attitude in European
thought about our government form.
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reads our official and semi-official propaganda will realize that the
concept of freedom is stressed a great deal more than such equalizing elements in our form of government as social security and the
graduated income tax. 10 By such stressing of freedom we naturally
tend to forget that this government is not a government of the free
alone, but is a government of the somewhat free and the somewhat
equal. To the extent that our citizens accept our propaganda as fully
representative of our government they forget the principle of equality which is one of the twin bases of our form of government.
With this background it is easy to see why the decision in Shelley
v. Kraemer created considerable unfavorable comment and why the
recent decision in Barrows v. Jackson will do likewise. 11 Superficially the decisions seem to force an equality that probably a majority of Americans do not desire1 2 Despite this, however, the
decisions were in the area of negro housing, where many realized
that, particularly in the large cities in the North, a change is necessary to avoid tremendous strains on race relations. Thus the
effect of these decisions in areas less crucial than negro housing
10. Even when our propaganda is stressing something like our social security, systems, there is a great tendency to emphasize any freedom involved, even
if it involves distortion. When we get into the area where social security
should be emphasized, that is, in the area of our standard of living, we find
stressed the fact that we have the necessary freedom to obtain that standard
of living. To call everything that seems good "freedom," or a product of it,
is a type of chicanery that will be discovered by those who are subject to this
propaganda. The truth is not so disconcerting that it must be hidden; in fact
the truth might make the propaganda more saleable.
11. Ini Comment, 45 MicE. L. REv. 733 (1947), it was stated that it was unlikely that racial restrictive covenants could be outlawed by statute in any jurisdiction in this country. Kahen, Validity of anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants,
12 U. CH. L. Riv. 198, 210 (1945) describes the unsuccessful Illinois attempts to
bar these agreements by legislation. In S omm, TE NwcnRo's SHm.z 201
n. 12 (1943), the author gives the result of a poll taken by Fortune Magazine.
Depending on the area in the country, 77 to 87% of the people polled favored
residential segregation, based either on legal provisions or social pressure.
12. It is interesting to note that, while most people would tend to reject the
result of this case on the basis that it interferes with their freedom to use
their property as they wish, actually the result has been the requirement of one
equality in place of another. Property subject to a racial restrictive covenant
is by self-definition restrained as to ownership or occupancy. And, except
for the original convenantees, there is no contract involved. While the initial
parties to the agreement are bound by privity of contract, later owners of the
property are bound only by privity of estate. See CLARK, RUL COVFNANTS
AN4D OTHER
INTEREsTS WnrcH "RuN WI Tn LAN " 111-5 (2d ed. 1947). And
these later owners may well be bound against their will, even if they have not
courted law suits by selling to a member of one of the races restricted. So, in
actual effect, despite the talk about freedoms being destroyed by the decision,
the actual case decided only that an exchange of equality publicly imposed must
be made for one privately imposed. And a person who sells property to a restricted class member has really regained more freedom to use his property
as he wishes, that is, to sell it to anyone he desires to.
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will undoubtedly cause even more of a furore. Areas traditionally
considered purely private will now have to be scanned for constitutional objections never before faced in those areas. Since the
possible coverage of the decisions may greatly expand those fields
where the state and Federal governments can interpose their restraining hands, an analysis of the effect of these cases seems to he
required.
Shelley v. Kraemer was decided on two points. First, it was
held that action of the state court in enforcing a racial restrictive covenant privately entered into was state action, and, second, that this
enforcement was a denial of equal protection of the laws. Barrows
v. Jackson, basing its decision on the state action theory of the
Shelley case, found a denial of equal protection of the laws in a
state court's granting damages for the violation of a racial restrictive covenant, even though the suit was between the white vendor and
other white owners whose property was subject to the same covenant.
In this article, an analysis will first be made of the state action
concept of Shelley v. Kraemer, and then an analysis will be made
of the equal protection of the laws argument in the opinions.

H.
STATE AcTIoN
3

Shelley v. Kraemer' has been characterized as the most important case decided by the United States Supreme Court during
its 1947-48 term. 14 The reason is clear. By finding, from the
facts of the case, state action under the terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court notably changed the area of protection of
the Amendment. Once the Court found the presence of state action, the equal protection argument could be settled on the authority
of Buchanan v.

Warley,1 5 certainly not a recent nor novel case.

13. 334 U. S. 1 (1948).
14. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-48, 16 U. CHi. L. REV.
1, 22 (1948).
Professor Frank adds: "Paradoxically, its practical consequence in the immediately foreseeable future will be small."
15. 245 U. S. 60 (1917). This case held that a city ordinance which in effect
zoned areas for white and negro occupancy was unconstitutional, as denying
equal protection of the laws. A somewhat similar ordinance was declared unconstitutional in Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668 (1927). These two cases
arose where white sellers were attempting to dispose of their properties free
of these zoning requirements. In City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S.
704 (1939), the Court, on authority of the Buchanan case, declared a negrowhite zoning ordinance unconstitutional as applied to a negro barred from
occupancy of certain property. These cases are discussed in the opinion of the
Shelley case, 334 U. S. at 11, 12.
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Thus, it seems advisable to analyze Shelley v. Kraemer by shortly
reviewing the concept of state action and then determining what
changes to the pre-1948 concept were made by the case.
In part, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution states:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person the
equal protection of the laws.
The Fifteenth 16 and Nineteenth t7 Amendments, as well as certain
sections of the original articles of the Constitution,' 8 also speak of
action by the state. What does this term, state action, mean in these
sections of the Constitution? If, at this time, without aid of any
prior decisions or writings, an analysis of the concept of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment was made, one of two conclusions would be arrived at. The first, and obvious one, is to
interpret it as the common understanding of the average man
would construe it, that the state must officially act through one of
its official agencies. But, using legal theory, one might come to
a second conclusion. Private action, such as the making of a
contract, creates law for that specific contract, and this law is of as
binding force in its own area as a law passed by a state legislature. 19
As such acts create law of the state, the action of creating them is
state action. Looking at the problem a trifle differently but still
arriving at the same result, using again the making of a contract
as our example, we find that all action is either prohibited or per-

mitted by the state, with the exception of certain constitutionally
guaranteed individual rights. Thus, if the state has allowed us
to make a certain contract, it has acted as a party to the making
16. "The right of citizens . .. to vote shall not be denied or abridged

by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
17. "The right of citizens . . .to vote shall not be denied or abridged ...
by any state on account of sex."
18. Most such restrictions on state action are enumerated in Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution. Implied restrictions on the states exist, of course,
by reason of the grant of certain powers by the Constitution to the Federal
government, such as the commerce power.
19. "They are commands of the sovereign as political superiors although
they are set by the sovereign circuitously or remotely." I AusiIN, Ltcrutzs

180 (5th ed. 1885). See also Akzin, The Concept of Legislation, 21 IowA L. Rzv. 713, 744 (1936).
oiN JuPsRuDnMcE
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of itP° Either of these theories, or better analytically, a combination of the two,2 1 makes nearly all acts of individuals state action.
For better or worse, the first and readily comprehensible interpretation of state action was used by the courts, though if the other
had been used2 the courts at least would have been able to avoid
spending considerable time creating fine distinctions which eventually crumbled before other fine distinctions.
The history of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests why there was undoubtedly a conscious effort made to limit
its effect after its adoption. The Amendment, along with the
Thirteenth and the Fifteenth, were drafted by a Congress interested in assuring Republican domination of the country in perpetuity. One method by which this was to be done was the
assurance of effective negro voting, and the assurance of the negro's
attachment to the party by obtaining for the negro the same rights
and privileges that white citizens23 enjoyed.24 After the drafting
of these Amendments, Congress required that the Southern states
20. 3 BENTHAM, WORKS 159-60; Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison
of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COL. L. Rrv. 149, 199 (1935);
Barnett, What is State Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth
A-mendments of the Constitution?, 24 ORSG. L. Rxv. 227, 228 (1945) ; Comment,
45 MicH. L. Rv. 733, 747 (1947). See Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, in
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 26, 57-9 (1883).
21. Most commentators, as those cited in notes 19 and 20 supra, have joined
these two theories to justify their conclusion that action by an individual is action of the state.
22. In FLACK, ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 262-3 (1908), it
is stated that early opinion about the Amendment indicated that it included
action of individuals. See also Watt & Orlikoff, The Coming Vindication of
Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 ILL. L. REv. 13, 28-33 (1949). For a contrary view,
see Note, 96 U. PA. L. Rrv. 402, 403 (1948), where the writer states: "Evidence would indicate that both those who proposed the Amendments and the
Congress that passed them has in mind only state legislative action."
23. The Fifteenth Amendment and the "privileges and immunities" clause
of the Fourteenth apply to citizens of the United States. The "due process of
law" and "equal protection of the laws" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
apply to all persons within the jurisdiction of a state, and are not limited to
citizens.
24. See 14 STAT. 27, 8 U.S.C. § 42 (1946), cited in the Shelley case, 334
U. S. at 11: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." And in
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S.339, 344-5 (1879), the Court stated: "One great
purpose of these amendments was to raise the colored race from that condition
of inferiority and servitude in which most of them had previously stood, into
perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons with the jurisdiction of the
State. They were intended to take away all possibility of oppression by law
because of race or color." See Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, Adamson v.
California, 332 U. S. 46, 68, 72 n. 5 (1947); Frank & Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 CoL. L. Rzv. 131, 134-5,
166-7 (1950).
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25
seeking readmission to the Union ratify these Amendments.
But, by the time the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
reached the United States Supreme Court, the temper of the country, or at least of the Court itself, was somewhat less intent on
carrying out the original purposes of the Amendments. 26 There
was less interest in the protection of the Negro as opposed to the
white.2 7 When the Civil Rights Cases28 came before the Court,
it could limit the effect of the Amendments. The Court therefore
interpreted action of the state as the more common understanding
of the term would suggest, as not applying to actions by one individual in relation to another but to direct action by the state upon
the individual.2 9 Thus the Court effectively prevented Federal control of non-public action in the field covered by the Amendments;
and action by the state was limited to that action which was obviously and immediately that of a state agency. The Federal government was to police only the states and the states were to be left to
police the individuals.
It has been aptly suggested that public action and private action
are opposite poles of a continuous spectrum.30 Certainly we find
that, except in certain areas near those poles, there is considerable
difference of opinion as to whether a given action should be defined

25. Fairman, Does the FourteenthAnwudment Incorporatethe Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding,2 STANFORD L. R v. 5, 126 (1948).
26. Certainly the "privileges and immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had already been rendered ineffective in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16
Wall. 36 (1873), and the clause has shown little life since then. The emasculation of the clause is doubly surprising since the best information available
indicated that the draftsmen thought of this clause as the heart of the Amendment, and the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses were added
perhaps more for euphony and balance of expression than for content.
27. See Watt & Orlikoff, The Coming Vindication of Mr. .tstice Harlan,
44 ILL. L. Rzv. 13, 28-33 (1949), for a picture of the changes in the political
situation and, particularly, in the outlook of the Republican party, which took
place during the period from 1865 to 1880. For a view that it was the original
purpose of the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Congress
that passed it to protect property interests, as the Amendment eventually came
to be interpreted, see LEARY, DuE PRoCEss AND EQUAL PROTXcTI N (unpublished
thesis in the Princeton University Library, 1932). The view is unusual.
28. 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
29. Id. at 17. "In this connection it is proper to state that civil rights, such
as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in
the shape of laws, customs, or executive or judicial proceedings. The wrongful
act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private
wrong .

. . ."

This idea did not spring full-grown in this case.

See, e. g.,

Cruikshank v. United States, 92 U. S. 542, 545 (1875) : "This [due process of
law] adds nothing to the rights of one citizen against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the state upon the
fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society."
30. Comment, Race Discriminationht Housing, 57 YALE L. J. 426, 434 (1948).
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as public or private. 31 To the Civil Rights Cases Court it was
apparent that action by the legislative, executive, and judicial bodies of the state government was action by the state. But when
governments increased their regulation of the individual, when private agencies began to exercise what had been considered public
functions, and when attempts were made to circumvent the Amendments by the use of what was purportedly individual action, the
Couit expanded its concept of what constituted state action. If
this had not been done the Amendments could easily have become
dead letters in many areas of discrimination. More and more of
what had been considered private action came to be considered action by the state.
The fact that state action has had to move further and further
across the spectrum toward the pole of private action may well indicate that the original concept of state action as accepted by the
Court was an error in constitutional law theory, if not in political
judgment. A certain amount of the movement has undoubtedly
been caused by the economic, social, and political changes in this
country, but the larger part of the movement has been caused by
the Court's desire to try to maintain the Amendments as effective
instruments of Federal control of states and their governments.
The Court's expansion of the original concept of state action
has taken two channels. 82 The first has been through the use of
what has been referred to as the instrumentality theory.33 Under
this theory, simply stated, action by a private individual or group
becomes the action of the state when the ability to discriminate
within the meanings of the Amendments is, in some manner, given
by the state to the private individual or group.M An example of
31. Compare, e. g., Note, Disintegration of a Concept- State Action Under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 96 U. PA. L. Rz,. 402 (1948), with
Lathrop, The Restrictive Covenant Cases, [1948] Wis. L. Rtv. 508.
32. Note, State Action Reconsidered in the Light of Shelley v. Kraemer, 48

COL. L. Rwv. 1241, 1242 (1948).
33. Ibid. See Note, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to Private

Organizations,61 HARV. L. Rnv. 344 (1948), for an excellent analysis of the
present state of the law by which private agencies are considered arms of the
state. "The cases . . . seem to establish the principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment sets limits to the activities of a private organization which exercises a governmental function or which has a sufficient nexus with the state.
Such doubts as exist stem from two circumstances: (1) the Supreme Court,
while implicitly subscribing to this view, has never expressly stated the proposition; (2) much uncertainty exists as to the exact relationship necessary to
invoke the Amendment." Id. at 347.
34. The writer in a note in 23 TEmlp. L. Q. 209 at 210 (1950) suggests the
following: "An over simplification of the test for the rule (if a rule can be
deduced) might be: It is not who does, (or acts), but what is done, to whon,
with what effect." It would seem that this test is a bit too broad and all-
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the use of this theory is in the primary election cases, where a state
political party, a private organization, in a succession of ways attempted to prevent negroes from voting in the primaries for any
candidates of the party. 5 While this trend has existed, it has not
had what would seem like logical and uniform application.86 It
may be that, in this area, an empirical determination of whether a
given group or individual is a state agency is necessary. Certainly
a conceptual approach is difficult to use if courts will consider that
slightly different facts make a great difference in result. But the
very confusion in this area suggests that the instrumentality theory
is only a device on which to hang a result. It gives the courts a
considerable area of freedom and they can, still using the theory,
decide many cases either way.
The other channel through which the area of public action has
been increased at the expense of private action has been through
the expansion of the area of what action by an admittedly state
agency is state action under the Amendments.8 7 Even before the
Civil Rights Cases3 8 the Court had decided in Ex parte Virginia39
that discriminatory action by a state judge in selecting a jury under
a non-discriminatory state statute was state action. But Mr. Justice Field in dissent pleaded that this, as a judicial and not a minisinclusive, for it does not sufficiently suggest the necessity of state action in
some manner. In Note, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to Private
Organizations, 61 HARv.L. Rrv. 344, 345, the writer suggests: "A more realistic justification for applying the Fourteenth Amendment would rely less on
the anthropomorphic concept of state action and more on the conjunction of
the individual act and governmental authority." This applies to the entire
state action concept, of course, but it suggests an excellent testing method to
use in applying the instrumentality theory to a set of facts.
35. Nixon v. Heradon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S.
73 (1932) ; Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935) ; United States v. Classic,
313 U. S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Rice v.
Elmore, 165 F. 2d 287 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 875 (1948) ; Terry
v. Adams, 73 Sup. Ct. 809 (1953).
36. Certainly arriving at opposite results in determining if there is state action has depended in many cases on the slightest differences. An example of
this confusion can be found in Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F. 2d
212 (4th Cir. 1947) (finding state action) and Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948) (not finding state action).
The latter case has been subjected to criticism, 62 HAzv. L. Rnv. 126 (1948),
both for its use of the "subject to public control" test, rejected by the U. S.
Supreme Court in 1932, and its very narrow distinguishing of the Pratt Library
case, which was decided in the same circuit in which the district court was
sitting.
37. "The . . . problem is one of determining whether the causal relation between acts of what is admittedly a state agency and the resultant denial of a
civil right is sufficiently direct to bring that action within the constitutional
ban." Note, State Action Reconsidered in the Light of Shelley v. Kraemer,
48 COL. L. Rrv. 1241, 1242 (1948).
38. 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
39. 100 U. S. 339 (1879).
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terial act, was beyond the Fourteenth Amendment. 40 And the
battle has continually been fought as to exactly what action of a
state agency is sufficient to deny rights under the Amendment, particularly if the state agency acted beyond, in violation of, or in
direct opposition to the authority given it by the state. 4 1 Even as
late as 1945, the Court was not exactly certain if an act by a state
official in violation of state law was clearly state action.4 2 Logically it is difficult to see how action in direct violation of state law
could be state action, and this, too, may suggest that the entire
concept of state action is artificial. Not only has the original limitation had to be continually expanded through the use of two separate theories, but in addition the expansion of the two separate
theories has failed to follow any logical road, unless a general though
erratic trend toward effectuating the purpose of the Amendments,
no matter how, can be considered logical development.
This short and elementary analysis of the concept of state action
as it existed before Shelley v. Kraemer4s was decided, establishes a
background from which to consider exactly what change that case
did make in the law. Its holding made judicial enforcement of racial
restrictive covenants state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, even though, as the Court stated, the
covenants as purely private agreements did not violate the Amendment,44 enforcement of the agreements by state courts was such
state action as denied the equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 45 But an opinion of this sort generally
presents many more problems than it actually answers, and many
of these problems arise here from attempting to determine the limits,
40. Id. at 349. And see also Field's dissent in Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S.
313,324 (1879).
41. The uneven history has been excellently reviewed in Barnett, What is
State Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Anmzdtnents of
the Constitution?, 24 Om. L. REv. 229, 233-43 (1945). Dual limitations developed to restrict the application of the state action concept to all action by
officers or agencies of the state. The first arose from the case of Arrowsmith
v. Harmoning, 118 U. S. 194 (1886), where the Court held that no state action
was present when the state law would, if properly enforced by the state executive and judicial officers, provide the protection guaranteed by the Amendments.
This case, though occasionally cited, was expressly repudiated as early as 1907
and the doctrine is only a matter of history. But several years earlier, in
Barney v. City of New York, 193 U. S. 430 (1904), the Court held that no
state action in violation of the Amendments existed when state officers and
agencies act beyond the scope of their authority as determined by state law.
This doctrine has had very spotty acceptance since the time it was promulgated,
being sometimes accepted completely and at other times expressly repudiated.
42. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).

43. 334 U. S. 1 (1948).
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id. at 23.
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or lack of limits, of the concept of state action from the expressions
of the Court. We have discussed briefly the two channels by which
the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts have expanded the original concept of state action. It would seem, from
the opinion in the Shelley case, that the second channel has now been
completely opened, i. e., any action by an admitted state agency,
although its action may be very attenuated in relation to a deprivation of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, becomes state action
in violation of the Amendment.
Shelley v. Kraemer arose in a critical area, that of negro housing.
The sociological, political, and economic factors creating and created
by the negro housing situation have been extensively covered elsewhere.46 Despite the fact that perhaps even a majority of the people
in this country did not favor improving the housing situation of the
negroes by destroying racial restrictive covenant enforceability, still
those persons living in the larger cities, particularly in the North,
and interested in the problem knew the tensions being created and
the great harms being done. The Court was thus faced with a problem which was by nature incendiary and where equality, in any
true sense, was being denied. The conscience of the Court was
stirred by the dangerous situation which existed, at least in part,
through the use of racial restrictive covenants. 47 To an extent,
the language of the Chief Justice carried some of the Court's emotional and intellectual dislike for the situation before it, and it is
necessary to recall this in analyzing the case.
During the course of the opinion the Chief Justice stated:
It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state
46. The literature is so extensive that it would be unprofitable to compile
even a fairly representative list. But, in addition to a large number of law
review articles, see: To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRZSIDENT'S Co
r r1Tn ozi Cmn RIGHTS (1947); ABRAMS, RAc8 BIAS IN HousING (1947); GERTZ, Ama ICAN GHEros (1947); MooN, THE HIGH COST OF
PREJUDMcE (1947) ; JOHNSON, PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION (1945); MYRDAL, AN AmERIcAN DILEMMA

(1944);

STERNER, THE NEGRO's SHARE

(1943).

47. But see Frank, op. cit. supra note 14, and the quotation there about the
practical effectiveness of the decision. Professor Frank analyzes the Indianapolis, Indiana, situation in his article, and finds that restrictive covenants had
been the last-ditch defense of those working to keep the negroes out of certain areas. Effective racial segregation was obtained by other means, since
negroes had not been able to break into white residential areas, and no case
litigating a restrictive covenant could be found. It is worthy of note that
Indianapolis is one of the northern cities where the negro population is limited
to a very restricted area, and where the natural tendency would be to try by
all possible means to get out of the present areas which are completely inadequate. Where negro housing is adequate to take care of the negro population,

there is very little likelihood of negroes trying to purchase property in white
districts, since the pressure is much less.
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courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners
would have been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint. 48
And, later, he stated:
. . . these are cases in which the States have made available
to such individuals the full coercive power of government .... 49
It is possible to argue that these phrases limit the concept of state
action to only those actions of any arm of the state which exhibit
"the full panoply of state power" or where "the full coercive
power of government" is present. 50 But any such argument would
seem to ignore the location of these statements in the opinion. They
were made as answers to the contention that any action of the state
existing here did not create the discrimination, that the states' part
in such a discrimination was too attenuated to be under the Amendment. 51 These statements of the Chief Justice exposed the weakness in the arguments being used, by stressing the actual effect of
the judicial action on the ability to discriminate. The statements
also are very vague, and it is impossible to define what is "the full
panoply of state power," of "the full coercive power of government."
It is difficult to imagine an instance where an agency of the state,
after in some manner directing certain action, would allow disobedience on the ground that the agency had not used "the full panoply
of state power." Certainly, for example, the ruling of an administrative board is enforceable without legislative approval of the specific
ruling, even though the power to make the rulings is through a grant
of legislative power. But if the Chief justice meant to describe only
the most formal and complete action of the state courts by these
phrases, he was still using them to describe only what actually existed
in these cases, and it would not appear that there was any intent
to set up any test of state action based on these phrases.3 2 Certainly
48. 334 U. S. at 19.
49. Ibid.
50. In Note, State Action Reconsidered hn the Light of Shelley v. Kraemer,
48 Cor. L. R v. 1241 (1948), the writer suggests such an argument might be

made if it is found desirable by the Court to limit the Shelley case. It is apparent that any such argument would do violence to the logic of the decision
and such manner of limiting the case is unlikely to be used unless the Court
is heavily pressed.

51. 334 U. S. at 14.
52. It is questionable, of course, if the Court would want to set up any test
anyway. It appears that the decision was largely based on the facts before the
Court and not on conceptual grounds. But, empirical or not, the decision
abounds in language which might later be used as tests. Whether such will be
done probably depends on the Court's desire in later cases to limit or expand
the doctrine of the case.
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the results of some of the cases cited by the Chief Justice could not
have been obtained using these phrases as tests, if they were meant
by the Chief Justice to do anything more than suggest the extent
of the power of a state court. It would seem that certain procedural
due process cases, such as the mob-dominated-trial cases,58 would
not meet the requirements of any test based on these phrases. The
cases were reversed not because the highest court in the state upheld
the lower court, but because in the lower court itself there was a
denial of due process. 54 The same is now true of rulings of administrative tribunals, for if they properly reach the Court, the Court's
decision does not depend on whether the ruling has the sanction of
the highest state court, but on the ruling itself.5 5 In the first case
involving the judicial branch of the state government and state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment, Ex parte Virginia,5 6 the action
of the judge in discriminatorily selecting a jury in disregard of a
state statute was held to be state action. Since the judge had violated
state law himself it would be logically difficult to say that his action
used "the full coercive power of government" or exhibited "the full
panoply of state power."
But, more conclusively, we have the statement of the Chief Justice that:
State action, as that phrase is understood for the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertion of state power in
37
all forms.
53. The Chief Justice cites Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923), at 334
U. S. at 16. Other procedural due process cases, where the denial interdicted
was that of the trial court, and not that of the appellate courts, are cited by
the Court, 334 U. S. at 17.
54. The Chief Justice speaks of the failure of the courts "to provide the
essentials of a fair hearing," in stating the holding of these cases. 334 U. S.

at 16, 17.

55. See note 41 supra. The law may not have been completely settled before
the Shelley case that a clear violation of sate law by an administrative body
might not have run into the difficulties of the Barney doctrine. The case of
Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278 (1913), however, clearly held such illegal action by an administrative body to be state
action, and it has never been overruled, or even questioned in a majority opinion
of the Court.
56. 100 U. S.339 (1879).
57. 334 U. S. at 20. Similar statements had been made by Mr. Justice Bradley
in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 11 (1883), and by Mr. Chief Justice
White in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278,
286 (1912). The latter case's interpretation of state action was broad but the
Civil Rights Cases are often considered to have a narrow holding as to what
constitutes state action, at least as compared with the dissent of Mr. Justice
Harlan. But the language of the case was broad, and the narrowness of the
holding only relates to the failure to accept individual action as within the
Fourteenth Amendment, and not to language limiting the meaning of what is
state action.
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This statement was made not during the course of argument in the
opinion, but is really the last sentence in that part of the opinion
which is limited to the determination of what is state action.5 8 Being
the conclusion of the Chief Justice, the phrase would seem, best of all
sentences in the opinion, to express the Court's actual considered view
of what constitutes state action. It is a reasoned conclusion, not
a statement made in answer to various contentions. If we accept
the analysis that this phrase is the best statement of the Court's
position concerning what is state action, it appears certain that any
action of a state court would be state action. The Chief Justice,
in using the word "power," seems to suggest that he is not limiting
state action to those actions which are authorized, but means to include all actions where the "power" of the state, or of one of its
agencies or officers, is sufficient to deny a civil right. The aura of
authority about a state officer or agency would create power to deny
a right, although actual authority did not exist. This analysis is
strengthened by the following statement of the Chief Justice:
And when the effect of that [state] action is to deny rights
subject to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
the obligation of this Court to enforce the constitutional commands.3 9
The use of the word "effect" suggests that the Court was interested
in the end result, not just the immediate consequence. It would
seem that the Chief Justice would not have used the vague word
"effect" if he was interested in limiting the meaning of the phrase
only to that which is immediate and direct. And, while not mentioned in the opinion, the Court has generally looked through any
smokescreens or veils to see if the final result of the action is such
a deprivation of a civil right as the Amendment disapproves.
The Court, during the course of its argument, in stating that the
racial restrictive agreements were valid as private agreements, further said:
So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated
by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that
58. The opinion, after this sentence, proceeds to settle the equal protection

of the laws argument. 334 U. S. at 20-3.
59. Id. at 20.
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there has been no action by the States and the provisions of the
Amendment have not been violated. 60
Standing alone, this statement would not be conclusive, of course.
But, in relation to the other statements that we have just examined,
particularly the one stating that "state action ... refers to exertions
of state power in all forms," 6 ' it supports the contention that any
action by an arm of the state is state action under the Amendment.
This statement was made as the initial premise from which the Court
worked in determining whether state action existed in these cases,
and is important as the only statement of what action the Court
excluded from the term state action. The Court, at least, was not
willing to exclude any other type of action as being clearly not state
action under the Amendment, even though the closer the premise
could be made to the actual facts, the simpler the decision of the
Court would have been.
It would thus appear that the language of the Supreme Court in
Shelley v. Kraemer made any and all action by any arm of the state,
whether direct or indirect, close or distant, alone or in conjunction
with private individuals or groups, state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Only such action as could be considered purely private,
voluntarily taken, and voluntarily complied with, by the private parties involved, would appear to escape the sanctions of the Amendment, if the result would be the denial of a right there protected
against state action.
But, as has been previously noted, the expansion of state action
has been in two directions. When we have been discussing what action of an admitted state agency was state action under the Amendment, we have been, in effect, deciding how deep the Amendment
has cut into the total area of discriminatory action. And we have
seen that it is probable that the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer
meant the depth of the Amendment to cut down until it arrived at
an area of purely private action, where no help of any instrumentality or agency of the state was sought or received.
But we still have a second direction to consider. While there has
been a continuing increase in the depth, to continue our simile, of
what constitutes state action, there has also been, through the use
of the instrumentality theory, a gradual widening of the area of state
action, where private individuals or groups have, for various reasons,
been construed as acting as an arm of the state. Has the result of
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. at 20.
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Shelley v. Kraemer changed the width of the area of state action?
It is considered that it has, although not in any direct sense. The
state instrumentality involved in the Shelley case was a state court,
and from the earliest cases such a court has been held an agency of
the state for purposes of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.62 But, indirectly, the case seems to undermine the whole instrumentality theory.
The Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer, was faced with the problem
of a discriminatory private agreement becoming state action by state
court enforcement. Instrumentality problems have also led to court
actions. 63 As an example, in the primary election cases, the state
courts had enforced the discrimination of the political party. Whether
the political party was an instrumentality of the state or not, the enforcement of its discrimination was state action. In an area similar
to the racial restrictive covenant situation, we can take the recent
64
New York case of Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation. There
the corporation discriminated against negroes in selecting tenants.
The corporation had been created under a special state law for redevelopment corporations, it used the state's power of eminent domain to obtain the property for the project, it obtained all street
areas in the property from the city in return for a certain lesser
area around the edge of the community, and it obtained from the
city a twenty-five year tax exemption on the value of the improvements. The New York Court of Appeals, in a closely divided decision, 65 held that the corporation was not such an instrumentality
of the state that state action could have been said to have caused or
sufficiently aided the discrimination to bring it within the Fourteenth
Amendment. If we ignore the actual holding of the case as to
whether the corporation was a state instrumentality, and look upon
the case as a court's supporting discrimination by a corporation,
whether public or private, we can see the application of Shelley v.
Kraemer to the instrumentality theory.66 It is not important if
Stuyvesant Town Corporation is an instrumentality of the state,
for, on its refusal to rent to negroes qua negroes, those refused can
62. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1879).
63. Not all individuals and groups which might have been called state instrumentalities have been brought into court when deprivation of some right has
existed, since, of course, the aggrieved party or parties may not ask for protection of their constitutional rights.
64. 229 N. Y. 512, 87 N. E. 2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 981
(1950).
65. Ibid. The decision was 4 to 3.
66. In the actual case it appears that the possible application of the rule of
Shelley v. Kraemer was not argued. Id. at 520-1, 532.
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sue. If the state courts support this refusal, there is state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The only question that arises
here is the standing of one so refused to sue in a state court. This,
of course, presents problems under that language of Shelley v.
Kraemer stating that all discrimination which is purely private is
legal.
The pertinent language of the Chief Justice is as follows:
. . . that Fourteenth Amendment etects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.6 7
He later states:
We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed . . . by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of these agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence
to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no
action by the State and the provisions of the Amendment have
68
not been violated.
With the emphasis, in these statements, on "merely private conduct,"
"standing alone," and "voluntary adherence," it would appear that
the Court's idea of what action is clearly not state action is very
limited. Certainly the whole tenor of the opinion is that what may
start out as private discrimination may easily become state action.
Thus, certainly, there is no shield given the person discriminating
merely because, initially, his action was not violative of the Amendment.
To return again to the Stuyvesant Town case, let us assume that
the corporation refused to rent to a negro applicant solely on the
ground of color. What can the negro do? It would seem, under
Shelley v. Kraemer, that he could bring suit alleging denial of equal
protection of the laws. 69 Even if the court wished to dismiss the
suit as not stating a cause of action, on the basis that only private,
not public, action was involved in the discrimination, it would seem
that the court could not do so without supporting the discrimination.
67. 334 U. S. at 13.
68. Ibid.
69. The Chief Justice stressed the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
secure "equality in the enjoyment of property rights." 334 U. S. at 10. And
property rights include the right to lease property. 334 U. S. at 11, quoting
section 1978 of the Revised Statutes, derived from section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. In the Dorsey case, the majority opinion held that the right to

lease was not a civil right under the New York Constitution. 229 N. Y. at 531.
No mention is made of any such right under the Federal Constitution.
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Since the Shelley case would seem to require only the most indirect
state support or aid to private discrimination in order to make the
Amendment applicable, the court would, therefore, have to find for
the negro plaintiff, presuming the establishment of the truth of his
allegations of discrimination.
There might be, of course, some difficulty in appealing a dismissal
of the negro's petition. Logically, the state court would seem to
be in a dilemma. If the court dismisses the action, the Shelley rule
is applicable, and if it does not dismiss the case but finds for the
negro petitioner, it is saying that purely private discrimination is
unconstitutional. But, by analogy to the Shelley case, the latter situation is not as extreme as it first seems. Granted the differences in
parties plaintiff, which should not affect the result of a case, the
difference between our case and the Shelley case lies in the effectiveness of the purely private part of the discriminatory action. In our
Stuyvesant Town-type situation, discrimination is complete unless
the negro wins a court action, while in the Shelley-type of case, the
discrimination is not effective until the court finds for the one desiring to support the discriminatory practices. But, as we saw
above in our analysis of the language of Shelley v. Kraemer, it
seems to be the end effect, not the direct result, of the state court
action which is crucial. Thus, if the court, by denying the negro
relief, whether for an injunction, damages, or declaratory judgment,
supports private discrimination, there is a denial of rights to the
negro under the Fourteenth Amendment. It would seem, therefore,
that any dismissal of a suit would be appealable on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds.70 In addition, it would appear that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus would lie against an inferior court
refusing relief, so that, even where appeal might be questioned, this
71
remedy would be available.
Using this analysis, it is apparent that, from the standpoint of
theory, the instrumentality doctrine has largely outlived its usefulness. It, of course, still has merit as a practical device to use in
these discrimination suits. If Stuyvesant Town Corporation could
70. Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 203, 234, 238 (1949).
71. Mandamus would seem to lie against an inferior court which refused to
hear this action but dismissed on motion or sustained a demurrer. HIGH,
EXTRAORDINARY RImEDIES §§ 147, 150 (3d ed. 1896).
This remedy was used
against the boards controlling state educational institutions in State of Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938) ; Sipuel v. Board of Regents
of University of Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631 (194) ; and Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U. S. 629 (1950).
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be enjoined, as a state agency, from discriminating against prospective tenants because of their race or color, the entire problem, by
that one action, would be solved, with only some policing of the corporation to check for contempt. If we use the theory derived from
Shelley v. Kraemer, the initial act of discrimination by Stuyvesant
Town would not be wrongful, so that if the corporation persisted in
its policy, a separate suit would be necessary for each refusal before
the discrimination became that protected against by the Fourteenth
Amendment. A class suit would not seem to lie, 72 nor would an
injunction be issuable running for anyone but the party plaintiff
against whom the corporation had originally discriminated. But,
although the mechanics of the actual suits would be different, it
does not seem that the instrumentality theory has any validity except
as a rationale which would tend to avoid a number of suits to obtain a result obtainable in one suit.73 Substantively, the results
would now seem to be the same, whether we have an instrumentality
theory or not.
Since the two methods by which the Court has expanded the concept of state action have been, in effect, by-passed by the interpretation of the concept in Shelley v. Kraemer, are we to assume the
concept has no further validity? This is certainly not true if we
accept the words of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in the case, for he
states:
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases...
the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional
law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to
72. Of course, once the corporation had refused to rent to a number of the
restricted group, there could be a spurious class suit for the benefit of that
group. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PaAcvicE 3442-56 (2d ed. 1948). But there is no
class suit device available for relief of all members of the restricted class,
independent of whether the corporation has refused to lease to them on their
request.
73. It is certain that any policy against a multiplicity of suits would not
override constitutional issues. If, of course, it was thought that the instrumentality theory should be used to avoid a multiplicity of suits, under many state
procedures the causes of action could be joined, or stated in the alternative.
Modem liberal provisions for amending petitions should avoid the necessity
of beginning a suit again because of dismissal on failure to state a cause of
action under the instrumentality theory. Any requirement that the suits be
tried separately, with the instrumentality theory cause of action being first
tried, would not only raise the question of multiplicity of suits, but more importantly constitutional questions of state action to deprive a person of his rights,
and action might lie against the judge himself.
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be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against
74
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
And the great majority of the opinion continued on from this statement to find the presence of state action. So, certainly the Court
had no apparent intent of destroying the vitality of the doctrine.
But when we find that a doctrine of limitation has expanded in
two ways, and expansion seems to be, in effect, complete in both
of them, we can well ask what is left of the original limitation. Purely private action is certainly still beyond the scope of the Amendment but what is the actual effect of that statement? If a person
deprived of rights by the private action of another can sue to enjoin, or for damages, and the courts of the states cannot take any
action supporting discrimination, it would seem that the area of
purely private action is a very limited one. Whether an action will
remain private, and not through a judicial suit become that of the
state, seems to depend primarily on the aggrieved party.
One other field that might be covered by the concept of state action
is where a state fails to act to prevent the private deprivation of a
right, particularly if there is a pattern of such deprivation within
the state. 75 Up to the time of Shelley v. Kraemer the theory that
state inaction is a part of the concept of state action had never been
accepted by the Supreme Court. And the Court did not consider
this possible contention in the Shelley case. But certain language
used, although it was used as a statement of premises rather than
of conclusion, can give little satisfaction to those who favor the
addition of state inaction to the concept of state action. The Court,
76
in addition to its remarks about "full panoply of state power" and
77
stated:
"full coercive power of government,"

These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States
have merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals
78
free to impose such discrimination as they see fit.
74. 334 U. S. at 13.

75. Barnett, What is State Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments?, 24 OREG. L. Rlv. 223, 232-3 (1945), points out that
some inaction by the state is clearly covered by the Amendments now. This
may be illustrated by omission to give proper notice, or of proper instructions
by a trial judge to a jury. The courts look upon this omission not as the offense itself, but as the basis for a finding that the state did not give a fair and
impartial trial. The state failed, by omission, to do its affirmative duty. Where
there is no such affirmative duty on the state, the state may still remain aloof.
76. 334 U. S. at 19.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
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Thus, the Court expressly negatived any decision on the basis of
the theory of state inaction, although it would appear that if that
theory had been accepted, the case could have been readily decided.
Even if state inaction had been accepted in its limited sense of applying only to failure of the state to stop a very marked pattern of discrimination, still such a pattern existed both in Missouri and Michigan.
To return to our initial question, does the concept of state action
still have any real meaning after Shelley v. Kraemer? While undoubtedly the effect of the case was to include as state action much
that up to that time had been excluded, the inclusion was done under
the traditional interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, i. e.,
that action of the state was necessary to bring the Amendment into
play. But, as we have seen, the only actions under the language of
the case now remaining private actions are those where there is
not any action, direct or indirect, by any agency of the state which
might effectively support private discrimination. This leaves only
a very narrow area which is not included within the Amendment.
Where discrimination is private and the aggrieved party seeks no
relief, the Fourteenth Amendment cannot apply. If the Court
eventually accepts a theory of state inaction as part of the concept
of state action, even purely private discrimination could be stopped,
at least if a pattern of such discrimination existed in the state. But,
at present, there is still this one area where private discrimination
can exist, as long as the party aggrieved will not take the action into
court. Generally, in fields of private law, we would say that if a
person had a "right" to obtain court relief, he was certainly fully
protected. In constitutional law the problem is not quite the same.
Rights can still be denied by intimidation, or even much milder social
pressure. Thus, the party aggrieved, although realizing that he has
been deprived of certain of his rights, may not act to pursue his remedies. If he does not sue, the Federal government or no other
party has, at present, the right to sue for him. Since the concept
of state action limits protection in this small area, the doctrine must
be said to have some remaining vitality. Unquestionably, however,
the concept of state action has been so expanded by the language of
Shelley v. Kraemner that its meaning has been lost as soon as cases
arise in state courts; once into court, the state will be acting.
We have, of course, analyzed Shelley v. Kraemer largely from its
own language. When a concept, such as state action, is so expanded
in one court opinion that it appears to be largely destroyed as a
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limitation, we may well inquire, first, if the Court realized this possible
effect of its language, and, second, even if it did, did it mean to
apply this language to all or only to certain situations. A quick answer,
if possibly a superficial one, to the first question is that Mr. Chief
79
Justice Vinson dissented very vigorously in Barrows v. Jackson,
which is not the most extreme case which could arise under the
Shelley doctrine, as we have developed it from its own language.
It is also obvious that this Shelley doctrine can be limited to the
actual type of fact situation presented in the case. The actual effect
of the case is to prevent a state court's forcing a private individual
to discriminate.80 Therefore, we cannot be certain that the Court
meant also to include situations where the private person desires to discriminate. Thus these twin possibilities, that the Court said more
than it meant to say and that it meant the language to apply only
to a limited number of situations which might come before it, are
still very real. Past constitutional history would suggest, however,
that even if the Shelley doctrine should be limited in the near future,
and not be extended as far as we have determined it logically could
be, the more distant future holds the promise, or threat, that the
more extreme view will be accepted. We have seen that the Court
has continually expanded its concept of what constitutes state action. While it may have used language in the Shelley case which
took it rather further than it expected, any limiting of the effect of
the case is likely to be temporary and, in time, we can expect the
broader interpretation of its language to determine what constitutes
state action.

79. 73 Sup. CT. 1031, 1037 (1953). The Chief Justice, of course, wrote the
Shelley opinion.
80. See Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L.
R. 555, 569 (1951).
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